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Abstract: The purpose of this research was to prove that political connections affect idiosyncratic risk and 
firm performance. The uniqueness of this research was that it involved religiosity, board characteristic, and 
institutional ownership as moderating variables that strengthen insights about corporate governance practices in 
religious corridors. The analysis technique used was the linear regression method to test the hypothesis using a 
sample of companies at the Indonesia Stock Exchange for 2016-2019. The political connection has a significant 
positive effect on idiosyncratic risk but a negative effect on performance. This study raises the corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) variable to contrast political connections in explaining corporate risk and performance. The 
result is that environmental CSR is more sensitive and significant than total CSR. All moderating variables 
(religiosity, characteristic board, and institutional ownership) strengthen all models. Political connections and 
environmental CSR have a significant influence on idiosyncratic risk and performance. Environmental CSR is 
better in reducing idiosyncratic risk and improving performance compared with total CSR. This study did not 
include the pyramid structure of majority ownership, so the measurement of political connection ignored it. In the 
future, it can be related to the relationship between political connections and the domination of controlling 
shareholders in the company. 
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Maintaining political connections has become an 
essential component of a company's non-market 
strategy to compete with other companies [1]. This 
activity is widespread not only in developed countries 
but also in developing countries such as Indonesia. As 
many as 55% of DPR (House of Representative) 
members in Indonesia are businessmen who are spread 




are primarily involved in the energy and oil and gas 
sector (15%) and technology, industry, manufacturing, 
and retail (15%). The rest are in the developer and 
contractor sectors (12%), the plantation, fishery, and 
livestock sectors (11%), to finance, and to the bank 
(6%). It shows that the involvement of political 
connections in the business world in Indonesia is 
relatively high. The impact is that the policies taken in 
parliament focus more on the interests of 
businesspeople and tend to ignore aspects of social and 
environmental justice. In addition, the government has 
difficulty controlling companies independently [3]. The 
involvement of businesspeople in politics causes the 
policy-making strategy to take sides and benefits the 
company's sustainability. 
There are two explanations in the literature 
regarding the impact of political connections on 
companies. The first explanation is the benefits of 
political connections for companies. Companies will 
provide incentives and select government executives 
from specific political backgrounds to increase the 
company's competitive advantage [4]. The government 
can regulate corporate activities and the economic 
environment through policies such as regulations and 
taxes [3] so that executives with political connections 
will influence these policies. It means that companies 
can make strategies by taking advantage of government 
policies, by building and maintaining connections with 
the government [1]. 
Meanwhile, the second explanation is the harmful 
impact of political connections on companies. 
Executives who have political connections will conflict 
with the principle of maximizing corporate value due to 
inefficient decision-making [1]. One example is an 
increase in employee salaries before the election to get 
support. Companies will be regulated in such a way as 
to produce goods or attributes of politicians, which will 
be rewarded in the form of subsidies or tax deductions. 
As a result, the management of company assets and 
resources is not used to maximize firm values. Two 
contradictory results indicate inconsistent results, so 
this study wanted to fill the gaps in the consistency of 
literature by applying it in developing countries like 
Indonesia. 
Apart from political connections, literature which 
uses the topic of CSR also has inconsistent results. 
Some research on CSR in developed countries can 
hardly be applied in developing countries [5] because 
they do not consider the contextual factors influencing 
CSR. Recently, CSR research has been applied in 
countries where most of the population is Muslim [5], 
but it does not consider religious orientation. This 
research is more critical because most CSR research in 
developing countries only takes compliance into 
account. Moreover, individuals with religious 
orientation show different attitudes towards CSR [5]. 
From the research results on political connections 
and CSR, there are inconsistencies in the results; 
therefore, they need to be reexamined. This research 
was aimed to answer the following questions: How do 
political and CSR connections affect idiosyncratic risk 
and performance? How can religiosity, characteristic 
board, and institutional ownership moderate the 
political and CSR connections to idiosyncratic and 
performance risks? The faith-based stock represents 
religiosity. The characteristic board used is the 
independent board. This research answers questions of 
interest not only to academics but also to capital market 
practitioners. Using a large sample of companies listed 
at the Indonesia Stock Exchange for 2016-2019, this 
study provides strong evidence that political 
connections and CSR influence idiosyncratic risk and 
performance. The novelty of this research is the 
inclusion of religiosity, board characteristic, and 
institutional ownership in seeing the influence of 
political connection and CSR on idiosyncratic risk and 
performance. 
The contribution of this research can be formulated 
as follows. First, there is almost no research on 
political connections to idiosyncratic risk moderated by 
religiosity, board characteristic, and institutional 
ownership, which have been conducted before. Second, 
in addition to the issue of company executives with 
political connections that are very interesting to 
research [4], the issue of religiosity associated with 
economic phenomena is still a new topic[5], [6], [7], so 
that the use of these two variables is beneficial for 
future studies. Third, research conducted in Indonesia 
as an emerging market is still minimal. Research on 
political connections has been carried out in several 
developed countries such as China [3], [4] and 
developing countries like Malaysia [1]. Research in 
both developed and developing countries has had 
inconsistent results. The nature and results of 
interactions differ in each country depending on the 
identity and conditions of each [8], [9]. This research is 
applied in Indonesia to fill up the gap from the previous 
literature for emerging markets. It is expected to 
contribute to corporate governance theory, stakeholder 
theory, and business ethics. Good corporate governance 
should enforce the transparency principles so that the 
political connection can increase the asymmetric 
information, which will harm the investors. The 
stakeholder theory and business ethics support the 
mechanism of company governance to retain the 
balance between financial goals and financial welfare. 
The balancing process can be seen from the company 
social responsibility(CSR) to the environment and the 
implementation of business ethics oriented to the 
moral, religious, and professional ethics as a long-term 
investment to enhance the company performance.   
The practical contribution of this research can be 
utilized by capital market players in assessing the 




becomes a point of concern for investors is that the 
religiosity mechanism that prioritizes morals and ethics 
supports good corporate governance. It was found that 
companies that rely on political connections can 
weaken investors' perceptions; on the other hand, 
companies' concern for the environment 
(environmental dimension CSR) strengthens the 
investors' perceptions. 
Novelty carried out in this research was that the 
approach adopted took the dimension of a non-
financial approach in favor of the stakeholder theory, 
namely religiosity, which is associated with the 
environmental dimension of CSR in responding to 
political connections in corporate governance. So far, 
the approach relied upon is the shareholder approach 
with a financial achievement orientation. Existing 
research results have ignored the religiosity in the 
influence of CSR and political connections on 
performance and existing risks. That is the uniqueness 
of this study, where the results of this study can prove 
that non-financial factors, namely religiosity, 
significantly affect performance. In addition to the fact 
that religiosity is rarely used in research, what is 
currently available is that religiosity stands alone as an 
independent variable so that its effect is seen directly. 
Thus, this research has a practical novelty by making 
religiosity a moderating variable that will strengthen or 
weaken CSR or political connections on the company 
risk and performance. 
The objective of this research was to prove that 
political connection and CSR affect idiosyncratic risk 
and performance. Another important objective was to 
analyze the mechanisms for religiosity, board 
characteristic, and institutional ownership to moderate 
political and CSR connections to idiosyncratic risk and 
performance. The remainder of this paper is organized 
as follows. Section 2 discusses the prior literature and 
Section 3 develops our methodology and research 
design. The result analysis is presented in Section 4. 
The discussion for empirical results is in Sections 5. 
Finally, the conclusions, suggestions, and limitations 
are presented in Section 6. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. Political Connection in Indonesia 
Political connotation is very different from 
government corruption. Different definitions for 
political connections are because political and 
economic systems vary from country to country [10]. 
The political connection can be indicated by a CEO 
who has a relationship with the government. Political 
relations in companies are divided into direct and 
indirect relationships with the government [11]. 
Political connections are widespread in various 
countries. Each one has its characteristics so that the 
impact of these connections will produce different 
effects according to the exogenous and endogenous 
factors involved. It is easier to cover up the trade-offs 
between business and politics [10]. Weak laws can 
make these exchanges stronger so that political 
connections quickly build value for the company. 
Therefore, it is essential to pay attention to the political 
environment in which companies operate to understand 
the factors that can hinder value creation and 
enhancement. 
In Indonesia, the 2019 elections noted many 
changes in the system. The fundamental change is the 
simultaneous implementation of the legislative 
elections and the president and vice president [12]. The 
change in the government leadership results in unstable 
policies, making companies cautious in making 
investment policies, and delaying or even reducing the 
investment [3]. The benefits of having a political 
connection in the company include increasing financial 
security [1] and assisting companies in obtaining loans 
from banks with lower interest rates and helping 
companies solve financing constraints [4]. However, 
companies can use political connections to over-invest, 
have lower productivity levels, and have higher debt 
ratios because they have easier access which will be 
detrimental for shareholders [13]. According to agency 
theory, the separation between shareholders and 
company managers results in information asymmetry. 
Political involvement by board members to use 
political resources in their interests can be a 
disadvantage for the shareholders [13]. As a result, the 
company's performance decreases, which will be a 
wrong signal for potential investors to increase the risk. 
H1: Political connections have a positive effect on 
idiosyncratic risk.  
H2: Political connections have adverse effects on 
the performance. 
 
2.2. Corporate Social Responsibility 
CSR is beneficial as a global phenomenon that 
occurs in various countries. The right way for the 
company to face the risk from the dynamic business 
environment is to have self-defense [13]. 
Environmental aspects in the internal and cultural 
scope must be considered. CSR is carried out in the 
form of benefits that can be felt directly or indirectly. 
CSR has been carried out in almost all companies and 
has increased from year to year. The implementation of 
social responsibility in Indonesia is regulated by the 
central government and local governments, both 
provincial and district or city. Apart from being a 
company strategy in gaining customer trust [14]. CSR 
has direct and indirect benefits and impacts on 
stakeholders [15]. For the community, CSR can be used 
to prevent corruption [16]. For companies, CSR 
involvement in the company can reduce risk and 
increase performance [17]. Meanwhile, the practice of 




implementation patterns, namely, activities carried out 
simultaneously with the community whose benefits can 
be directly felt by the community and activities carried 
out not simultaneously with the community, but the 
benefits can be felt directly by the community. 
Companies cannot be separated from the 
environment in their operations [18]. If social 
responsibility programs are defined as strategic aspects 
of operations, social responsibility programs will be 
included in operational costs. If not managed properly, 
these costs will hurt the company. Thus, in achieving 
company goals, consideration must be made from 
various stakeholders so that CSR can help reduce the 
risk of losing one or more support from stakeholders 
[19]. 
H3: CSR harms idiosyncratic risk. 
H4: CSR has a positive effect on performance. 
 
2.3. Moderating Variable of Religiosity, Board 
Independent, and Institutional Ownership 
Companies influenced by religiosity have a lower 
level of fraud risk, a lower error of estimation, so 
religiosity has a vast impact on unethical restraining 
behavior [20]. Executives working in Islamic 
institutions tend not to be involved in earnings 
management because they must be more ethical in 
managing the company [21]. Political connections in 
companies with faith-based stock will behave more in 
line with the "syariat” prescribed by religion [22]. This 
connection provides benefits to the company so that in 
its operations, executives with political connections 
will pay more attention to company value. CSR is used 
as an investment that is not just for branding the 
company or investing with an unfavorable impact on 
the company. Companies that own sharia shares will be 
prosecuted according to the truth so that the company's 
management will get more attention by investing in 
CSR. The result is that the firm's value will increase, 
and the company's idiosyncratic risk will below. 
The board of commissioners plays a crucial role in 
the company, especially in implementing good 
corporate governance (GCG). The board of 
commissioners functions to oversee the performance of 
the board of directors [22] so that the board of directors 
works to maximize the value of the company. With the 
existence of independent commissioners, it is hoped 
that the supervision of the board of directors will be 
tighter. Independent commissioners make GCG 
implementation better to reduce agency conflicts 
between principals and agents and can be used in the 
effective implementation of social responsibility. A 
high proportion of independent commissioners will 
monitor the actions of directors who are selfish to 
minimize agency costs [10]. That can increase investor 
confidence in a company. In addition, investors 
perceive the company to be good because the company 
has implemented GCG properly. Thus the company's 
stock price will increase, thereby increasing the market 
value of the company's assets and avoiding risks. 
Institutional investors and independent commissioners 
tend to see social responsibility not as an unprofitable 
investment tool so that idiosyncratic risk will decrease 
and performance will increase. 
According to [23], institutional ownership is the 
proportion of share ownership by institutional investors 
to the number of shares issued. These institutional 
investors include companies, banks, foundations, 
investment companies, insurance companies, and 
pension funds. Institutional investors can provide funds 
by using their relationships to assist corporate funding 
sources in developing the company and political 
connections. Institutional ownership can minimize 
agency problems that occur between managers and 
shareholders. Institutional investors can influence 
corporate behavior through several mechanisms [15]. 
First, it can advise management on steps and support to 
achieve goals. Second, it can provide additional capital 
to implement specific plans such as social 
responsibility. Third, it can use its voice to support or 
oppose the manager's plan. This mechanism can be 
used to produce changes in the risk that the company 
has. In addition, institutional investors (mutual funds, 
hedge funds, pension funds, or banks) are an essential 
group of investors in a company who can become 
supervisory managers. They tend to put considerable 
pressure on management to create wealth for investors 
so that managers pay much attention to fulfilling the 
financial targets set by investors. Through their 
interactions, institutional investors can correct their 
own cognitive biases [15]. Institutional investors have 
more significant incentives and efficiency in the 
company information-gathering process so that 
company supervision will be more effective and, in 
turn, can reduce information asymmetry. 
H5: Religiosity, board independence, and 
institutional ownership enforce political connections 
and CSR on the idiosyncratic risk and performance. 
 
3. Research Methods 
This study used panel regression analysis in 
analyzing idiosyncratic risk and performance. The 
criteria for the research data used were as follows. 
First, the company was listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange in 2016-2019. Second, disclose information 
for all variables studied was in the annual report in total 
and per dimension for CSR. Third, all necessary data 
for the control variables were available. Based on these 
criteria, a research sample of 547 firm years was 
obtained. The hypothesis was tested by regressing all 
samples obtained. 
The dependent variables were idiosyncratic risk and 
performance. The idiosyncratic risk was unique in 
certain investments that can be minimized with a well-




proxy volatility (IVOL).  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼1 + ∑ 𝛼2
12
𝑗=1 , 𝑗𝑅𝑖,𝑡−𝑡 + 𝛽𝑡(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡            
(1) 
where: 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the average rate of return on individual 
stocks in the portfolio, Rm is the average market rate of 
return, 𝑅𝑓  is the risk-free rate of return, 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  is the 
residual error. Stock return 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 can be calculated using 
historical data on the company's daily stock price from 
1 January 2016 to 31 December 2019. From the 
equation model above, we obtained the residual error 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡, which measures the average IVOL of shares. IVOL 
was measured as follows: 
𝑇𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 = √𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖,𝑡)                                          (2) 
The second dependent variable is performance, as 
measured by return on assets by dividing profit against 
total assets owned by the company. 
The independent variable is political connection and 
CSR (total CSR and environmental dimension CSR). 
Political connection is the involvement of the executive 
and government as measured by a dummy. Score 1 if 
the executive has executive involvement, while score 0 
means there is none. For CSR, it was collected from 
annual reports. The instrument used was the GRI index 
which had been adjusted to the conditions in Indonesia. 
CSR analysis was carried out using content analysis, 
where the disclosure was calculated using the CSR 
disclosure ratio. The moderating variables were the use 
of faith-based stock, independent boards, and 
institutional ownership. Control variables were cash 
holding (CASH), company size (SIZE), total debt 
(LEV), long-term debt ratio (LEVLT), Earning per 
share (EPS), Net Profit Margin (NPM), and Sales 
Growth (SG). The following are the model equation 
used to test the hypothesis: 
Model 1: 
𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑁𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                    (3) 
Model 2: 
𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑁𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽10𝐹𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡𝐹𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡𝐹𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽13𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡𝐹𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡            (4) 
Model 3: 
𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑁𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽10𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐾𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐾𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽13𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡       (5) 
Model 4: 
𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑁𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽10𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽13𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡               (6) 
Model 5: 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝑁𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡             (7) 
Model 6: 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝑁𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐹𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡𝐹𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡𝐹𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽13𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡𝐹𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡              (8) 
Model 7: 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝑁𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐾𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐾𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐾𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽13𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        (9) 
Model 8: 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝑁𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽13𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡              (10) 
 
4. Result and Discussion 
Table 1 presents a statistical description with the 
number of observations (N) as many as 547 firm years. 
The first moderating variable is FBS with an average 
value of 0.852, close to number 1, which indicates that 
most of them have used Islamic stocks. The 
independent board variable (INDK) has a minimum 
value of 20%, which indicates that companies in 
Indonesia have not met the minimum 30% regulation. 
Institutional ownership (IO) shows an average 
institutional share of 0.644 and a maximum of 0.979. 
Models 1, 2, and 4 show that political connections 
significantly positively affect idiosyncratic risk. The 
greater the political connection, the higher the 
idiosyncratic risk. Models 5-8 show that political 
connections have a significant negative effect on 
performance. The results of this study are supported by 
[24], which states that the existence of a political 
connection makes it possible for managers to invest 




general election, companies will be directed to produce 
things related to politics to have lower productivity 
levels for their core products. As a result, the company 
has a low income and a waste of resources. Political 
involvement by board members who use political 
resources for personal gain will be harmful to 
shareholders. 
Furthermore, having access to the government 
makes the process of borrowing funds very easy. If not 
controlled, the debt ratio will increase. If the debt is too 
high, the company's performance will deteriorate. 
 
Table 1 Statistical description (Author’s calculations) 
Variable N Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
PC 547 0,00 1,00 0,41 0,49 
CSRTOT 547 0,02 0,68 0,35 0,12 
CSRENV 547 0,00 1,00 0,37 0,27 
ROA 547 -0,31 0,46 0,04 0,07 
CASH 547 0,00 0,77 0,09 0,09 
EPS 547 -646,6 4050,2 138,4 417,44 
SIZE 547 24,61 33,30 28,74 1,58 
LEV 547 0,01 1,06 0,44 0,19 
LEVLT 547 0,00 2,17 0,17 0,18 
NPM 547 -0,40 0,62 0,06 0,14 
SG 547 -0,91 3,07 0,08 0,28 
IO 547 0,00 0,97 0,64 0,22 
PCIO 547 0,00 0,98 0,27 0,35 
CSRTOTIO 547 0,00 0,55 0,22 0,11 
CSRENVIO 547 0,00 0,94 0,23 0,20 
INDK 547 0,20 0,8 0,40 0,09 
PCINDK 547 0,00 0,83 0,16 0,21 
CSRTOTINDK 547 0,01 0,46 0,14 0,06 
CSRENVINDK 547 0,00 0,83 0,15 0,12 
FBS 534 0,00 1,00 0,85 0,35 
PCFBS 547 0,00 1,00 0,35 0,47 
CSRTOTFBS 547 0,00 0,63 0,29 0,16 
CSRENVFBS 547 0,00 1,00 0,31 0,2 
IVOL 547 0,01 0,43 0,07 0,05 
 
Models 1-4 show that total CSR has a negative and 
insignificant effect on idiosyncratic risk but a positive 
and insignificant effect on performance. Models 1-4 
show that environmental CSR has a significant 
negative effect on idiosyncratic risk. Meanwhile, 
Models 5-8 show that environmental CSR has a 
significant positive effect on performance. The higher 
the CSR, the lower the company's risk and the higher 
its performance. From these results, it can be seen that 
environmental CSR has a significant relationship while 
total CSR is not significant. The results of this study 
are in line with the research of [13]. In Indonesia, 
environmental CSR can better reduce idiosyncratic risk 
and improve performance compared to total CSR. The 
existence of insignificance in total CSR because 
contributions and donations to communities outside the 
environment are expected. Every company has carried 
out total CSR [23]. The impact of this CSR is not 
considered insignificant and does not help much in the 
contribution of increasing the company performance or 
reducing company risk. 
Environmental CSR has a critical role. Generally, 
environmental protection is something done by the 
government. Companies that disclose environmental 
CSR are considered very caring and involved in 
environmental empowerment. These activities make 
stakeholders feel satisfied with the company. As a 
result, the market will be more sensitive to the 
company, resulting in increased company performance. 
In addition, the idiosyncratic risk will decline because 
the company commits to being actively involved in 
protecting and caring for the environment so that it will 
gain market trust and avoid difficulties in obtaining 
capital. Environmental CSR activities and disclosures 
are used to gain legitimacy, reputation, trust, and 
support from stakeholders. In the end, investors think 
that all of this will provide performance stability, 
sustainability and reduce idiosyncratic risk. 
The first moderation in Islamic stocks was proxied 
by FBS (Models 2 and 6). Model 2 proves that FBS 
strengthens the positive influence of political 
connections on idiosyncratic risk. Model 6 shows that 
FBS strengthens the negative influence of political 
connections on performance. FBS reinforces the 
negative effect of environmental CSR on idiosyncratic 
risk. FBS also strengthens the positive influence of 
environmental CSR on performance. Political 
connections at FBS will behave more in line with the 
sharia (syariat) prescribed by religion [22]. This 
connection benefits the company so that executives 
with political connections will pay more attention to 
company value in its operations. In addition, CSR is 
used as an investment that is not just for branding the 
company or investing with an unfavorable impact on 
the company. Companies that own sharia shares will be 




management will pay close attention to investing in 
CSR. 
The second moderation is the independent board 
(INDK) (Models 3 and 7). Model 3 proves that INDK 
weakens the positive influence of political connections 
on idiosyncratic risk and strengthens the negative 
influence of political connections on performance 
(Model 6). INDK strengthens the negative influence of 
environmental CSR on idiosyncratic risk and 
strengthens the positive effect of environmental CSR 
on performance. The independent executive causes the 
implementation of GCG to be better to reduce agency 
conflicts between the principal and the agent and 
implement social responsibility to be effective. A high 
proportion of independent executives minimizes 






Table 2 Factors affecting idiosyncratic risk and performance (Author’s calculations, reviews release 1)  
VARIABLE 
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 MODEL 6 MODEL 7 MODEL 8 
t Sig t Sig t Sig t Sig t Sig t Sig t Sig t Sig 
PC 0,014 0,099* 0,159 0,087* 1,314 0,189 0,109 0,091* -2,016 0,044** -4,021 0,000*** -3,650 0,000*** -0,208 0,084* 
CSRTOT -0,743 0,458 -1,415 0,158 -1,125 0,261 -1,125 0,261 0,542 0,588 0,951 0,342 0,914 0,361 0,147 0,883 
CSRENV -1,964 0,050* -0,218 0,083* -0,175 0,086* -2,438 0,015** 2,163 0,031** 2,283 0,023** 2,662 0,008*** 0,934 0,035** 
CASH -1,236 0,022** -1,336 0,082* -1,170 0,243 -1,224 0,022** 1,652 0,099* 1,552 0,021** 2,010 0,045** 1,830 0,068* 
EPS 0,829 0,408 0,654 0,513 0,884 0,377 0,947 0,344 3,134 0,002*** 3,067 0,002*** 2,453 0,014** 2,758 0,006*** 
SIZE -3,542 0,000*** -3,512 0,000*** -3,416 0,001*** -3,795 0,000*** 1,932 0,054* 2,125 0,034** 2,625 0,009*** 1,957 0,051** 
LEV 0,527 0,598 0,272 0,786 0,675 0,500 0,951 0,342 -0,531 0,596 -1,034 0,302 -2,108 0,035** -0,472 0,637 
LEVLT 3,054 0,002*** 2,987 0,003*** 2,971 0,003*** 2,769 0,006*** -4,867 0,000*** -5,272 0,000*** -5,008 0,000*** -4,902 0,000*** 
NPM -0,437 0,066* -0,577 0,016** -0,357 0,072* -0,519 0,060* 14,692 0,000*** 13,908 0,000*** 14,249 0,000*** 14,754 0,000*** 
SG -2,354 0,019** -2,137 0,033** -2,343 0,019** -2,261 0,024** 1,599 0,011** 1,778 0,076* 1,919 0,056** 1,496 0,014** 
FBS  -  - 1,339 0,018**  -  -  -  -  -  - -0,142 0,089*  -  -  -  - 
PCFBS  -  - 0,254 0,080*  -  -  -  -  -  - -3,572 0,000***  -  -  -  - 
CSRTOTFBS  -  - 1,148 0,251  -  -  -  -  -  - 1,190 0,234  -  -  -  - 
CSRENVFBS  -  - 0,520 0,060*  -  -  -  -  -  - -1,615 0,011**  -  -  -  - 
INK  -  -  -  - -0,667 0,051*  -  -  -  -  -  - 3,385 0,001***  -  - 
PINK  -  -  -  - -1,345 0,018**  -  -  -  -  -  - 4,091 0,000***  -  - 
CSRTOTINDK  -  -  -  - 0,965 0,335  -  -  -  -  -  - 1,235 0,217  -  - 
CSRENVINDK  -  -  -  - -0,702 0,048**  -  -  -  -  -  - 3,157 0,002***  -  - 
IO  -  -  -  -  -  - 0,180 0,086*  -  -  -  -  -  - 0,561 0,058* 
PCIO  -  -  -  -  -  - 0,008 0,099*  -  -  -  -  -  - 0,852 0,039** 
CSRTOTIO  -  -  -  -  -  - -1,505 0,133  -  -  -  -  -  - 0,076 0,940 
CSRENVIO  -  -  -  -  -  - 1,941 0,053*  -  -  -  -  -  - 1,643 0,101 
Obs. 547 547 547 547 547 547 547 547 
Adj. R2 0,076 0,070 0,073 0,083 0,443 0,461 0,510 0,451 
F-stat 5,470 3,846 4,073 4,549 44,385 33,557 41,595 33,098 
 *** significant 1%  
** significant 5% 





The third moderation is institutional ownership (IO) 
in models 2 and 6. Model 2 shows that IO strengthens 
the positive influence of political connections on 
idiosyncratic risk and strengthens the negative 
influence of political connections on performance 
(Model 6). IO strengthens the negative influence of 
environmental CSR on idiosyncratic risk and 
strengthens the positive influence of environmental 
CSR on performance [13]. Institutional ownership can 
minimize agency problems that occur between 
managers and shareholders. Institutional investors can 
influence corporate behavior through several 
mechanisms [23]. They tend to put considerable 
pressure on management to create wealth for investors 
so that managers pay much attention to fulfilling the 
financial targets set by investors. Interactions among 




This study found that political connections have a 
significant positive effect on idiosyncratic risk but 
negatively affect performance. Total and environmental 
CSR harm idiosyncratic risk but have a positive effect 
on performance. The effect is not significant for total 
CSR, whereas, for environmental CSR, the effect is 
significant. It means that environmental CSR can 
reduce idiosyncratic risk and increase performance 
compared with the total CSR. All moderating variables 
(faith-based stock, independent board, and institutional 
ownership) can strengthen all research models. 
The result of this research can be helpful for 
company managers in managing the company. By 
reducing idiosyncratic risk and improving performance, 
the company will be able to survive amid competition. 
Apart from that, this research is also helpful for 
shareholders. By knowing the significant variables that 
can affect the company, the shareholders will achieve 
their goals.  
The practical limitation of this study lies in the 
description of the pyramid structure dominated by 
majority ownership which has not been exposed in 
depth so that the measurement of political connections 
does not involve these factors. In the future, for further 
research, religiosity and political connections can be 
linked with the pyramid ownership structure in 
Indonesia in the case of corporate governance. 
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